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-Introduction
What is a banking crisis? What happens if
it results in a collapse of the financial system?
A systematic banking crisis occurs when many
borrowers simultaneously experience difficul-
ties in making their loan payments. Banks
suddenly see a spike in nonperforming loans,
which lowers the value and quality of their loan
portfolios. Typically there are plummeting asset
prices as well. When the market comes to the
realization that "systematically important finan-
cial institutions are in distress," a full-blown
banking crisis can occur. (Laeven and Valencia)
When such crises strike, what is the best
course of action? During the 2008 global liquid-
ity crisis, countries like the U.S., U.K., and
Germany kept their banks afloat by bailing them
out. This action was designed to prevent cata-
strophic harm to the entire system by keeping
systematically important institutions, consid-
ered too big to fail, from failing. Some observers
regard the U.S. government’s decision to let
Lehman Brothers fail as a critical mistake that
resulted in a national liquidity crisis turning
into a global one. Lehman Brothers was just one
bank in the U.S., but what would be the con-
sequences if the entire banking sector collapsed
in a country? It happened in Iceland.
One of the first and worst casualties of
the 2008 global liquidity crisis was Iceland’s
banking sector. Within three days, the country’s
three largest banks failed, wiping out more than
85 percent of Iceland’s financial system. The
government took control of the pieces and
created new banks to assure domestic busi-
ness could continue. Many believed at the time
that the collapse of Iceland’s financial sector
would lead to long-term devastation for the
country. It was assumed that for the foreseeable
future, Icelanders would suffer the effects of the
collapse and that Iceland would be an example
to other countries that a banking collapse would
result in unthinkable consequences. However,
two years after Iceland’s collapse, none of these
consequences has happened. By the time Ice-
land realized that its banking industry had
grown too large to control, the 2008 global
liquidity crisis triggered a meltdown. In Ice-
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land’s case, the government had trouble secur-
ing enough foreign assistance to support the
banks, so failure might have been the only
option. Contrary to expectations, Iceland is
doing relatively well and seems to be on the way
to building a stable and sustainable financial sys-
tem, especially compared with other countries
still struggling with debt and inflated banking
sectors. In retrospect, other countries with
alternatives might have done better to have
followed Iceland and allowed their banks to col-
lapse instead of bailing them out.
Background
Before the 2008 crash, Iceland was known
for its banking sector’s large size relative to
the rest of the economy. Iceland’s enormous
banking sector was a relatively new phenome-
non. After a delayed start in the late 1800s,
Iceland was slow to develop a sophisticated
banking sector. Once liberalized in the 1990s,
growth exploded, bringing with it a painful
warning in 2006.
Slow Development
Several factors hindered the development
of Iceland’s banking system throughout the
1900s. Iceland suffered banking troubles, reces-
sions, periods of high inflation, and restrictive
policies.  Operating in a small fishing nation,
Icelandic banks often lent large amounts of
money to individual fishing companies, mean-
ing a bad fishing season occasionally led to bank
failures and even economic recession. (Boyes)
Iceland has also experienced its share of high
inflation. Until 1992, inflation was chronically
high, in the double digits. 
Even with a volatile fishing industry and
chronic inflation, government regulations
remained the biggest hindrance to the Icelandic
banking industry. Throughout the 1900s, the
Icelandic market was tightly regulated, more so
than in continental Europe. Large commer-
cial banking operations remained under govern-
ment control until their privatization in the
1990s, capital controls were in place from
1931 until 1994, and interest rates on deposits
and loans were fixed by the government until
1985. (Jónsson, p. 44)
Rapid Development
After being stalled for much of the 1900s,
Iceland’s banking sector saw tremendous
growth during the 1990s. (Jónsson, p. 38) In
1994 Iceland joined the European Economic
Area, providing access to the single European
market, opening opportunities for expansion,
and lowering the amount of money banks
needed to keep in reserves. (“New Rules …”)
In 1992, the central bank began using monetary
policy to bring inflation under control, down to
2 percent to 3 percent annually. The corporate
income tax rate was also drastically reduced
from 55 percent in 1988 to 15 percent in 2008,
allowing a larger proportion of profits to fuel
more growth. These developments liberalized
Iceland so quickly that the country went from
having one of the most sheltered economies
in Scandinavia to the freest economy in Scan-
dinavia. 
Although the liberalization of the mar-
kets is often cited as one of the causes of the cri-
sis in Iceland, according to an interview with
Icelandic economist Gylfi Magnusson, the man-
ner in which the banks were privatized was
the critical element that led to collapse. (Boyes)
The Prime Minister at that time, David Odds-
son, believed that it was “unhealthy if too much
power is in too few hands,” so the Executive
Committee on Privatization was tasked with pri-
vatizing the banks. The committee decided that
one entity or individual could own no more than
a four percent share in a bank. Instead, poli-
tics soon got in the way and controlling shares
in banks were sold off to leveraged holding com-
panies. The concentration of ownership in these
companies, burdened by debt, was a recipe for
epic financial disaster.
With the banks in private hands and the
markets liberalized, rapid expansion abroad
commenced. The Icelandic banks quickly dis-
covered that organic growth abroad was a slow
process and focused most of their efforts on
acquisitions. (Jónsson)
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A Painful Warning
With aggressive international expansion
and a ballooning carry trade,1 the world began
to take notice of Iceland in 2006. Analysts
were concerned with excessive lending to
related entities, high correlation of assets,
dependence on the wholesale markets, and a
limited ability of the government to provide sup-
port. (Flannery) In what became known as the
Geyser Crisis, Iceland received a sharp warn-
ing that its system needed to be changed. Debt
became more expensive for Icelanders to issue,
Iceland Stock Exchange stocks were shorted,
and Iceland’s currency was shorted as well.
Working together, the Central Bank of Iceland
(CBI) and Icelandic banks were able to fend
off the crisis and return to business as usual,
at least temporarily. This warning should have
been enough to convince Icelanders to make
changes to their system, but it was not. (Jóns-
son, pp. 58-82)
Bank Balance Sheets
Before the 2008 collapse, the balance sheets
of Iceland’s three largest banks, Kaupthing,
Íslandsbanki, and Glitner, provided initial evi-
dence of an impending collapse. By analyzing
the assets, liabilities, and owners' equity of the
banks, financial collapse is no surprise to a keen
observer.
Assets
A majority of banks’ assets are frequently
loans to customers, and banks may hold assets
in the form of shares of ownership in other com-
panies, which can include acquired banks and
their loans. In the case of Iceland’s three largest
banks, the quality and makeup of their loan
portfolios, systematic risk exposure, and rapid
expansion abroad provided a warning that the
long-term financial future was not as rosy as
earnings reports seemed to indicate for the short
term.
In 2006, 74.57 percent of Kaupthing’s assets
came from loans to customers and credit insti-
tutions, so much about the bank’s financial
health can be observed in the quality of its
loan portfolio. (“Kaupthing Bank …”) In 2008,
the allowance for loan losses ratio was approx-
imately 0.96 percent combined over the three
large Icelandic banks (Kaupthing, Íslandsbanki,
and Glitner), meaning that less than one per-
cent of all loans made were considered bad
loans, a suspiciously low number. (Flannery,
p. 4) In contrast, an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) study in mid 2007 determined
that 90 percent of loans made by these three
major banks were of good quality, but a trou-
bling majority of these loans were indexed to
inflation or denominated in foreign currency.
(Jónsson)
Inflation or exchange rate changes could
hurt the banks’ loan portfolios because the
amount of krónur a client owed would rise,
making default more likely especially if the
client has no foreign operations. (Caruana and
Chopra, p. 16) In addition, while foreign lend-
ing increased 120 percent during the first half
of 2008, the allowance for loan losses ratio
lagged severely behind during the same period,
rising less than 1 percent. The reason for the
sudden rise in foreign lending is even more dis-
concerting. Iceland’s Truth Report2 concluded
that while other foreign banks were tighten-
ing lending standards, Icelandic banks were
increasing lending. This new business was likely
low-quality loans because these foreign borrow-
ers were only coming to Icelandic banks after
their regular banks had rejected their busi-
ness. (Flannery, p. 4) 
With such a small economy and concen-
tration of financial power in only three banks,
systematic risk and the possibility of other chain
reactions were a real concern. If one company
encountered financial trouble, its assets could
be liquidated, but if several companies encoun-
tered financial trouble, placing all the stocks
in the Icelandic stock market (ICEX) for sale
would be impossible. (Jónsson, p. 96) Further,
the banks routinely financed employee and com-
pany purchases of their own stock, inflating
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1 Carry trade is when investors borrow money in a
country with low interest rates and invest it in a country
with high interest rates to make a profit. Because Iceland
had very high interest rates, capital poured into the coun-
try due to this trading strategy.
2 The Truth Report is a document detailing Ice-
land’s financial crisis and what happened. It was written
by the Special Investigation Commission, which was
appointed by the Icelandic government to investigate and
analyze the crisis. It is considered to be comprehensive,
accurate, and unbiased.
bank balance sheets. In 2008, the banks also
kept their stock prices high by buying approx-
imately 45 percent of all automatically matched
trades of their shares while selling only 2 per-
cent of automatically matched trades. (“Chap-
ter 2 …,” p. 4) This interrelatedness is not a
problem when ICEX stocks are rising in value
because everyone is making money, but eventu-
ally the bubble bursts. Knowing that bank stock
was the collateral for many of the three banks’
loans, the interrelatedness of Icelandic banks
became especially troubling when the ICEX
began to tumble in mid 2007 (Figure 1). (Flan-
nery) With banks’ share value declining, banks
faced declining loan portfolio quality, declin-
ing asset values, and a declining ability of their
owners to support them. 
The last troubling issue was the pace of
foreign expansion. From 2004 through 2007,
bank assets increased ninefold from 100 percent
of GDP to 923 percent of GDP. With a small
domestic market, a majority of this asset growth
had to come from abroad. After the economic
liberalization of the 1990s, bank expansion took
off. In Meltdown Iceland, Roger Boyes compares
standard acquisition practices to those used
by the Icelandic banks. Acquired companies nor-
mally invite an acquirer in to show them how
the business is run. However, many Icelandic
acquirers were not interested in how their newly
acquired firms did business. While rapid expan-
sion can significantly strain a system, careless
expansion undoubtedly strains more.
Examining Icelandic bank assets in terms
of the quality of their loan portfolios, levels of
systematic risk, and speed of foreign expan-
sion indicates that questions should have been
raised about the path of the banks long before
the crash of 2008. 
Liabilities
Liabilities are obligations that a company
must repay in a specified manner over a period
of time. Companies looking to raise money
can secure funding through various sources,
such as getting a loan from a bank or issuing
bonds and commercial paper in the market. Just
as telling as the assets of the three Icelandic
banks were the sources of funding the banks
used to support those assets. A majority of their
funding was derived from the same source,
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Figure 1
Value of Iceland’s Aggregate Share Price Index
which led to questions of whether credit would
always be available and whether the Icelandic
government could be a reliable backup fund-
ing source in tough times. 
With the liberalization of its markets and
subsequent explosive growth, Iceland needed
capital to grow. Conveniently, the global econ-
omy was experiencing a period of low interest
rates combined with easy access to credit. Much
of Icelandic banks’ funding needs could be
obtained from Europe’s medium-term note
(MTN) market, debt securities that typically
mature within five to ten years. The banks had
high credit ratings and the Icelandic govern-
ment was virtually debt-free, making it easy to
access the debt markets. 
The MTN market can be a great source of
funding, but only while credit remains relatively
cheap and easy. At maturity, a bank usually does
not have the money to pay off the notes and
needs to raise additional money to meet its obli-
gations. If credit gets more expensive or liq-
uidity dries up, it can be risky to fund with
shorter-term liabilities because there is a risk
that funding costs will go up significantly when
those notes come due, or funding could dry
up entirely, leaving no market to raise the
needed funds.
Banks reportedly learned their lesson
from the Geyser Crisis in 2006 and diversified
their funding sources by beginning retail deposit
campaigns, a source considered less risky than
the MTN market. However, retail deposits,
although usually more secure than notes, are
not risk-free funding. Retail savings accounts
are sensitive to interest rate yields. Icelandic
banks attracted customers because they offered
higher rates than competitors. Money would flee
retail accounts if they did not maintain high
rates. 
Finally, if funding is too difficult to find
elsewhere, a home country’s central bank is usu-
ally a reliable backup funding source to provide
the necessary liquidity to a bank until economic
conditions stabilize. During the financial cri-
sis of 2008, this is precisely what other central
banks did, including the central banks of the
U.S. and the EU. But even before the financial
crisis, analysts began to question whether or not
the Icelandic government could assist its banks
should economic times become difficult. Few
questioned that the CBI would try to assist
the banks, although some wondered if it would
be capable. Taking into account the resources
of the CBI in comparison to the large size of the
banking sector, many analysts believed that
the CBI would not be able to save the banks in
the case of serious financial trouble. (Flan-
nery)
With funding available from so few sources,
the Icelandic banks could not afford to be shut
out of international markets or see interest rates
skyrocket. Although easy credit made their
funding model appear to work well, analysts
observed that should economic conditions
worsen, Icelandic banks would have a tough
road ahead, especially considering their govern-
ment’s limited capabilities to be a lender of
last resort in times of need.
Owners’ Equity
Owners’ equity in a business is the por-
tion of investment in the company that comes
from the owners of the company. In public com-
panies, firms can raise capital by issuing shares
that represent an ownership interest in the com-
pany. In any small economy, some degree of
interconnectedness can be expected, but there
is a limit to how much interconnectedness
can be considered healthy. In Iceland, the pro-
file of bank owners and the relationship between
banks and owners should have been a warning.
Who were the owners of the Icelandic
banks? Behind each of the three banks, there
was a large holding company. According to an
IMF country report in 2008, the average lever-
age of Icelandic bank owners was greater than
the European average, a troubling fact if the
banks ever found themselves in trouble and in
need of assistance from their owners. Because
of their high leverage, the banks’ owners would
probably not be able to provide the needed fund-
ing support. Iceland also had a great deal of
ownership mystification. Outsiders were often
unclear exactly who owned what due to fuzzy
ownership structures. Before the collapse, many
companies in Iceland had ties to at least one
of the big banks.
In most cases, the banks’ owners (i.e.
holding companies) were the biggest clients of
the banks. The holding companies brought busi-
ness and fees to the banks, and the banks con-
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tinued to lend them money, often to purchase
more stock in the banks themselves. (Jónsson,
p. 97) However, this extensive symbiotic rela-
tionship between the banks and their owners
is not healthy. In 2008, Iceland’s three banks’
combined lending portfolio had more than 23
individual exposures, each consisting of more
than 10 percent of that bank’s equity. (Jóns-
son, p. 129) Glitner’s owner, the Bauger Group,
owed €5.5 billion to the three banks, which
was 11 percent of the banks’ entire lending port-
folio and 53 percent of their aggregate capital.
(“Chapter 2 …,” p. 2) When Kaupthing tight-
ened lending in 2002, the group moved on to
Landsbanki, and when they also tightened lend-
ing, the Bauger Group moved on to Glitner.
An owner’s failure could take down the entire
system, so the banks were forced to do every-
thing in their power to keep these holding com-
panies afloat.
In short, a review of the assets, liabilities,
and owners’ equity on the balance sheets of Ice-
land’s banks shows that change was needed. Ice-
landic banks would not be able to continue busi-
ness as usual without making significant
changes to integral parts of the system.
Iceland’s Financial System Collapses
By September 2008, it became clear that
the global financial system was in turmoil and
Icelandic banks were having trouble staying
afloat. Liquidity had dried up and credit was
hard to come by. Icelandic officials soon found
themselves enacting emergency legislation,
arguing with the U.K. and the Netherlands, and
asking the IMF for assistance.
On October 6, 2008, the Icelandic gov-
ernment passed emergency legislation that gave
the government extraordinary powers to deal
with the impending financial demise of the
country. This emergency legislation, the Wall of
Shields Act, gave the Financial Supervisory
Authority the power to take control of a com-
pany’s decision-making process, to control a
company’s assets, and to demand that a com-
pany apply for a moratorium on payments to
creditors. The Act also gave the Minister of
Finance the power to finance the creation of
new firms or take over existing firms. (“Act Pro-
viding …”)
In the months leading up to October 2008,
Icelandic banks found it increasingly difficult to
find funding sources. When money began to
flow out of Internet savings accounts, the banks
ended up in real trouble. They turned to the
CBI, which, although able to provide some fund-
ing, did not have the funding to save all three.
So on October 7, 2008, Landsbanki and Glit-
ner were brought under government control.
On the next day, due to a domino effect,
Kaupthing was brought under government con-
trol, meaning that a total of 85 percent of Ice-
land’s financial system had just collapsed. (Jóns-
son) 
The new emergency legislation divided each
of the three banks into two banks, an old (bad)
bank and a new (good) bank. The new banks
each received all of the domestic assets and
liabilities contained in the corresponding failed
bank, so that banking inside the country would
continue. Bank customers would be able to
access their savings accounts, make payments,
and continue business within the country.
Everything else, including all derivatives and
foreign assets, was relegated to the old bank.
Each of the three old banks was left with frozen
assets that would need to be valued and grad-
ually sold off. The new banks would need to
compensate the old banks for the fair value of
the assets that had been taken from them and
put into the new banks. (“The Icelandic Govern-
ment’s…”) A later agreement was reached that
the creditors of the old banks would become the
owners of the new banks.
The Wall of Shields also secured domestic
deposits, placing domestic depositors above
bondholders and foreign depositors. This cru-
cial change was one of the catalysts that sent the
Icelandic-British relationship into turmoil.
Landsbanki’s Icesave accounts were retail
deposit accounts in the U.K. and Netherlands
backed by an Icelandic guarantee. When Lands-
banki collapsed, the British and Dutch gov-
ernments guaranteed and paid out deposits to
avoid panic in their own systems. Questions
then arose about Iceland’s legal responsibility
to repay the British and Dutch governments,
because the deposits were backed by an Ice-
landic deposit guarantee. To add to the ten-
sion between the countries, the U.K. used
antiterrorist legislation to freeze all Icelandic
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assets in the U.K. (Jónsson, p. 179) This move
was the final straw that took down Kaupthing
bank the day after Landsbanki fell. Icelanders
were left feeling offended that Britain had effec-
tively declared their nation a terrorist state, and
the British were left wary of Icelandic creditwor-
thiness, even though Iceland promised to fulfill
its obligations.
Finally, as Iceland sought help, it found
itself repeatedly directed toward the IMF for
assistance in stabilizing and rebuilding its finan-
cial sector. On October 24, 2008, the IMF
announced a program with Iceland that
included a $2 billion loan. The Faroe Islands,
Norway, and Poland also agreed to supply loans
to Iceland. (“Factsheet: The Icesave Issue”)
The IMF included conditions that Iceland
needed to meet in order to satisfy three main
goals. Two initial goals were to create a func-
tioning banking sector in Iceland and to stabi-
lize the króna. The last goal, more long term,
was to reduce the public debt burden on the
country to ensure a manageable repayment
plan. To fulfill these goals, Iceland has been
implementing reforms to manage the new
banks, restructure corporate and individual
debt, and set up a new financial framework. To
stabilize the króna, Iceland implemented a cap-
ital control program to prevent large amounts
of money from fleeing the country and further
devaluing the króna. Finally, various changes to
fiscal policy and the government budget were
made to bring public debt under control, with
an additional reduction coming from the pro-
ceeds of the sale of assets in the failed banks.
In sum, the October 2008 liquidity crisis
was the tipping point in a string of systemic
problems that caused Iceland’s financial col-
lapse, which then led to emergency legisla-
tion, tensions with the U.K. and the Nether-
lands, and finally to IMF assistance. 
Analysis
More than two years after Iceland’s finan-
cial collapse, the effects that the collapse has had
on the financial sector can be examined. At
the height of the global crisis, bank failure
was looked on as a worst-case scenario. Many
governments took drastic steps to assure their
countries’ systems remained intact. Iceland
found itself at a point where bank failure was the
only option available. 
However, post failure, Iceland has found
itself in a favorable position compared with
other countries that opted to bail out their
banks. Iceland has found that many of the severe
consequences assumed to be a result of collapse
were either nonexistent or not as severe as
expected. Analyzing the outcomes of Iceland’s
financial collapse reveals that allowing a bank-
ing system to collapse when it gets too big to be
managed may not be the worst outcome. Per-
haps other countries can consider following Ice-
land’s example when looking for a plausible way
to handle an unmanageable banking sector.
Opportunities
Unlike other countries struggling to bring
their economies out of distress, Iceland has seen
positive developments since its financial col-
lapse. Iceland did not drag out a long period
of turmoil and trouble; instead, it deleveraged
itself quickly so that future generations would
not be dealing with an overinflated system. In
the process, it was able to completely redefine
its banking and financial policies.
By January 2011, two and a half years
after the financial crisis, there were still coun-
tries struggling to keep their financial systems
afloat. Ireland asked the IMF for support after
being unable to fix its ailing financial sector,
Greece and Portugal suffered through serious
debt problems, and the sustainability of Spain’s
financial sector, the fifth largest economy in
Europe, was coming under question. (Stelzer)
Iceland, on the other hand, reported growth
in the third quarter of 2010. (Ward) After fail-
ing in 2008, Iceland was able to quickly get
the assistance it needed to restructure and
rebuild its financial sector, unlike other coun-
tries that dragged out the pain before finally
calling for help. To save ailing financial systems,
the accepted method during the crisis seems
to have been government bailouts of banks. This
strategy greatly increases the debt burden on
taxpayers. In contrast, Iceland did not bail out
its banks. It promised to meet obligations in full
to domestic depositors and the minimum
requirement to foreign depositors, but in
essence told shareholders and creditors that
they were out of luck and needed to wait until
the banks’ assets were unwound to get any
money back. Iceland’s action caused gross
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public debt to soar from approximately 30 per-
cent in 2007 to a peak of 115 percent in 2010
due to “a recession on public finances, need to
recapitalize, crisis related central bank losses,
and foreign deposit requirements.” (Thomsen
and Roaf, p. 4) However, as assets are recov-
ered from banks, the economy rebounds, the
currency appreciates after a sharp decline, and
external debts are expected to shrink. By 2015,
the IMF estimates that Iceland’s gross govern-
ment debt will be down to a manageable level of
76 percent. Figure 2 illustrates that after Ice-
land’s debt peaked in 2010, expected debt
declines sharply compared with the expected
public debt of other countries, which show a
slow and steady climb after an initial spike.
(“World Economic Outlook Database”) Perhaps
this is because Iceland forced shareholders
and creditors to absorb bank losses while other
governments took on the burden of bank losses
as public debt.
By deleveraging, Iceland has saved future
generations from dealing with an oversized
financial system. Five years earlier in 2003,
the system’s assets amounted to less than two
times GDP. (Flannery) Before the collapse in
2008, the assets in Iceland’s banking industry
amounted to a phenomenal nine times GDP.
Figure 3 shows how large this is compared to
other economies. The only country with a sys-
tem of similar size is Switzerland, and the
next largest system is the U.K.’s at 4.5 times
GDP. The question remains, How big is too big?
For Iceland, nine times GDP was not sustain-
able, and the collapse has allowed the country
to bring the system under control. In addi-
tion, external debt (the debt owed to foreigners)
had reached 605 percent of GDP in the pre-
crisis period.  This figure fell to approximately
300 percent of GDP two years into the post-
crisis period. By 2015, external debt levels are
expected to drop to 190 percent of GDP. (Thom-
sen and Roaf) Again, this is an example of how
the collapse helped bring debt under control.
The banking collapse has removed the extensive
web of interrelated ownership and reduced
inflated asset prices. Despite the crash, the aver-
age person likewise has not suffered as harshly
as expected. Unemployment rose from around
1.6 percent in 2008 to a peak of 9.4 percent in
January 2009 and GDP fell by nearly 6.8 percent
in 2009, but both measures have since begun to
rebound. (“World Economic Outlook Database”)
In essence, Iceland is one of the only coun-
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Figure 2
Gross Government Debt
tries that can claim to have "solved" its bank-
ing problems, because the banking industry as
it formerly existed is no longer in operation.
(Jónsson, p. 200) 
Another advantage resulting from the finan-
cial collapse is an opportunity to completely
redefine the financial regulatory framework
with fewer hindrances.  Without the influence
of private banks to lobby against changes, Ice-
land has a more straightforward task at hand.
Iceland can also redefine monetary policy and
more easily implement temporary measures
to help get the country back on track. 
The same advantage has also allowed Ice-
land to bring down its interest rates and stabi-
lize its currency. Before the crisis, foreign funds
poured into the country to take advantage of
Iceland’s high interest rates and perceived low
risk. This influx of capital in turn drove high
growth and currency appreciation. Iceland’s pol-
icy officials followed a generally accepted stan-
dard for monetary policy management. To
keep inflation from rising above certain tar-
gets during times of high growth, policymakers
raised interest rates to make borrowing the cap-
ital necessary to continue the unsustainable
growth more difficult. In Iceland’s case, this plan
continued to backfire, bringing more foreign
funds into the country to take advantage of
higher interest rates. Lowering interest rates
would cause large amounts of capital to flee the
country, leaving Iceland unstable and exposed
to deflation. With the previous financial sys-
tem still in place, Icelandic officials were find-
ing it difficult to fix these problems. (Jónsson)
After the collapse, through the use of capital
controls that restrict the flow of funds in and
out of the country, Iceland has brought interest
rates down from a peak of 19 percent to less
than 4 percent in October 2010. In addition, the
króna has begun to appreciate as interest rates
have been brought down to be more in line with
similar economies. Also, the government has
been using a primary trade surplus to acquire
foreign currency reserves and is working at
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Figure 3
Banking Group Assets as Percent of GDP in the Global Financial Crisis
3 For more information about financial regulation,
see article by Giglia in this issue.
Notes: Total consolidated assets from domestically held owned banking sector only.  Includes assets of domestic banks held
abroad.  End-2007 except UK (end-2008) and Iceland (June 2008).
Source: Bank of England; Central Bank of Iceland.
removing the capital controls as soon as pos-
sible. (Thomsen and Roaf) Without the financial
collapse, interest rates might be at 19 percent
or higher in Iceland.
Initial Pitfalls
In the immediate aftermath of Iceland’s
financial collapse, economists and former
bankers worried that Iceland’s reputation in
international markets would be damaged
beyond repair. Icelanders worried that the col-
lapse would leave an onerous financial burden
on future generations. There was fear that Ice-
landic banking failures would trigger a global
chain of events, leaving banks and investors
holding worthless Icelandic assets or at least tied
up in bankruptcy proceedings for years. How-
ever, a review of these perceived pitfalls reveals
that in the long run, the benefits outweighed
the negatives.
Typically, countries bail out financially trou-
bled banks to avoid diminishing their global
credit rating. A fear that debts will not be repaid
means that lending stops or that the price of
debt skyrockets. Greece and Ireland are two
countries that have recently seen a significant
rise in the price of issuing debt, signaling the
global hesitancy to lend money to the countries.
In contrast, Iceland’s image in the global mar-
ket is on the rise. (Martin, Ward) Icelanders have
brought their currency under control and are
nearing plans to allow it to freely float. They
have implemented the IMF’s program goals
for restructuring and brought in financial
experts to redesign their financial sector. The
resolution of the Icesave dispute with the U.K.
and the Netherlands will further boost Iceland’s
reputation by demonstrating its creditworthi-
ness and desire to repay its debts. (“Icelandic
Voters …”) So, while a damaged reputation that
could cut a country off from the global mar-
kets may be a good reason to avoid collapse,
in Iceland's case, this fear was exaggerated.
Careful attention has been taken in Ice-
land to assure that the fallout from the finan-
cial crisis does not become a burden for future
generations, and so far officials are addressing
this concern. As discussed previously, although
Iceland’s gross public debt increased from 30
percent to 125 percent, it is expected to come
down in the coming years to a range in line with
other advanced economies. Although an official
agreement has not yet been reached, negotia-
tions between Iceland, U.K., and the Nether-
lands for the repayment of Icesave deposit insur-
ance obligations also reflect this sentiment. In
2009, a tentative agreement was reached
whereby Icelanders would pay a 5.5 percent
interest rate on their obligations. A year later,
a new tentative agreement was reached to assure
a more manageable debt burden. The average
interest rate for the new agreement is 3.2 per-
cent, with a ceiling on payments of 5 percent
of treasury revenue and a minimum of at least
1.3 percent of GDP. After assets are recovered
from the banks, it is expected that the Icelandic
treasury will be responsible only for the inter-
est payments. (“Summary of the Negotiating
Committee…”) These terms imply a cost that is
only one-third of the original agreement.4 
Regardless of how beneficial the banking
collapse has been for Iceland, it may not be
the solution in every case. The global chain of
events that can occur from bank failures is a
critical consideration. When Lehman Brothers
failed, its interconnectedness within the entire
system left other banks with worthless assets
and struggling to find necessary liquidity or
credit to maintain operations. Luckily for Ice-
land, its financial system was small enough in
comparison to the global economy that,
although its failure caused alarm, it did not
set off a global chain of events. 
Although a financial collapse can be diffi-
cult to accept, in Iceland’s case, the benefits that
arose from the collapse have had favorable, if
unexpected, consequences. Many of the per-
ceived consequences turned out to be less severe
or even nonexistent as events played out.
Conclusion
In the wake of its financial collapse, Ice-
land has proved that there is more than one path
to recovery. Having made a late entry into the
banking world, Icelanders attempted to make
up for lost time as their banking system bal-
looned into one of the largest systems in the
world relative to country GDP. The industry was
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In a vote on April 9, 2011, the Icelandic public again
rejected this agreement. Iceland, the U.K., and the Nether-
lands will now likely proceed to court to settle this dis-
pute.
fraught with irresponsible practices before
and after the industry was liberalized in the
1990s. Before the collapse, Iceland’s three
largest banks maintained balance sheets sug-
gesting that the system could not continue to
sustain current business practices. The Icelandic
banking system’s collapse has allowed for the
financial rebirth that Iceland needed to mend
its system.
Iceland’s success story may be an example for
other countries with unsustainable banking sys-
tems, although financial collapse is not a strat-
egy that should be considered lightly. Only by
understanding the circumstances surround-
ing Iceland’s financial collapse is it possible to
estimate whether this approach can work for
other countries. One lesson from Iceland’s expe-
rience is that financial collapse does not nec-
essarily lead to horrific consequences.
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